The Political Process as Final Solution by Freeland, Charles M.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 68 | Issue 2 Article 5
Spring 1993
The Political Process as Final Solution
Charles M. Freeland
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Freeland, Charles M. (1993) "The Political Process as Final Solution," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 68 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol68/iss2/5
The Political Process as Final Solution
CHARLES M. FREELAND*
One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of
individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals-justice or
progress or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred mission
or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself,
which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society.
This is the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine
revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the
pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an
uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution.'
INTRODUCTION
When James Madison wrote his famous warning to Thomas Jefferson
that bills of rights were no more than "parchment barriers," 2 he may have
had in mind a concern very similar to that of Isaiah Berlin about the
dangers of "final solutions." Words on paper, Madison may have thought,
will not restrain a democratically elected majority that knows the "truth."
Madison may also have known that ultimately even the Supreme Court
would be subject to democratic political forces. 3 He may also have known
how intolerant and tyrannical those forces could be.4
* J.D., 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. The author wishes to thank
Professors Stephen A. Conrad and Daniel 0. Conkle for their constructive comments and suggestions
during the preparation of this Note. The opinions expressed remain, however, entirely
those of the author.
I. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 167 (2d ed. 1970).
2. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, 1788-1789, at 295-300 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 242 (James Madison) (The New American Library ed. 1961).
4. 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 298-300. This remarkable letter to Jefferson
includes, inter alia, the following insights:
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the constituents .... Wherever there is an
interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be done, and not less readily by a
powerful & interested party than by a powerful and interested prince....
The restrictions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded when
opposed to the decided sense of the public; and after repeated violations in extraordinary
cases, they will lose even their ordinary efficacy.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Madison understood the conflicting values inherent in the Constitution.5
Virtually the entire document is devoted to defining structure and process
in an effort to ensure the government functions "democratically."' 6 At the
same time, the government created by the Constitution is one of limited
and enumerated powers. Many of the framers believed that the inherent
limitations of the central government were obvious from the text of the
Constitution.7 The people need not fear a government doing something
which it manifestly has not been empowered to do. So important were the
rights "retained by the people"' that the states refused to ratify the new
Constitution without a promise that a Bill of Rights be appended to it.9
This Note argues that, some two hundred years after the adoption of the
Bill of Rights, Madison's fears are being realized. The "parchment
barrier" is being pierced by the forces of a "great historical ideal,"' the
democratic political process." Energized by the economic conditions of
the 1930s, the political process, in the 1980s and 1990s, may be taking on
5. Id.
6. The notion of just what "democratically" means has evolved over the years. Even today there
is no universally adopted definition. Some would say that it means "equality"; some would say that it
means "freedom"; others would say that it simply means representative of "the people." The
governmental structure and process set forth in the Constitution is "democratic" in that ultimate power
flows from those persons designated as electors; sometimes directly, as with the House of
Representatives, and sometimes indirectly, as with the Supreme Court. Other than the direct election of
senators and the election of the Vice President, the basic structure has not changed much. The definition
of electors, on the other hand, has expanded dramatically from white, male, property owners to virtually
universal adult suffrage. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1051-57 (1984) (using "democratic" to mean majoritarian and
materially egalitarian); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
439 (1987) (describing "common law market ordering" as undemocratic and "collective control" as
"necessary to achieve democracy").
7. ROBERT A. RuTILAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 1776-1791, at 132-33 (1983); THE
FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (The New American Library ed. 1961).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
9. RUTLAND, supra note 7, at 126-28.
10. See supra text accompanying note 1.
11. The term "political process" is used in this Note to mean democratic majoritarian control of the
coercive power of the state without constraints respecting the autonomy of disagreeing minorities. The
political process ideal incorporates the belief that citizens in the political minority may legitimately be
used as a means to achieve the ends of citizens in the political majority, with justification resting on
nothing more than the fact of numerical superiority. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. To be
sure, the rise of the political process ideal, almost by definition, is not an unhappy event for those who
count themselves among the political majority. Some legal scholars see the fading of the Bill of Rights
as the long awaited solution to the "countermajoritarian problem" that has always plagued the
"democracy as material equality" school of political thought. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 6; Bruce
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. Rv. 713, 715 (1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Supreme Court 1988 Term-Forward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 61 (1989);




the status of a "final solution," that is, an ideal so revered that it is
invoked to justify the violation of other highly valued ideals. "[A]fter
repeated violations in extraordinary cases," the values of the Bill of
Rights are losing "even their ordinary efficacy."' 2
The argument made in this Note, that the values of the Bill of Rights
are being crowded out by political process values, rests on an analysis of
several key decisions of the modern Supreme Court 3 in which the issue
of individual autonomy versus state control is clearly drawn. This Note
compares these decisions, and the values on which they are based, with
several important and familiar decisions of the 1930s. The discussion of
the New Deal cases may present a perspective not normally found in law
school casebooks. The central thesis of this Note is that, contrary to the
received wisdom, the "conservative"' 4 decisions of the modern Court are
the logical, even inevitable, extension of the New Deal Era decisions and
the political process values on which those decisions were founded. To the
extent that the Bill of Rights is vanishing, it began to fade in the
1930s. 5 Further, this Note demonstrates that the modern decisions may
show the emergence of a majoritarian consensus that threatens to render
the concepts of limited government and individual autonomy virtually
meaningless "when opposed to the decided sense of the public,"' 6 not
only with respect to economic activities, but also concerning the most
intimate aspects of our daily lives. Finally, this Note suggests that the
conventional political labels "conservative" and "liberal" are no longer
adequate and should be replaced by "majoritarian" and "libertarian,"
respectively, terms that more accurately reflect the fundamentally opposed
values at work in American jurisprudence.
12. 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 300.
13. For the purposes of this Note, the "modem" Court can be measured from the decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the Court halted the expansion of the right of privacy and
signaled the second end of substantive due process. See infra part III.A. The analysis of these cases is
not intended to represent an exhaustive review of "modem" Supreme Court decisions, but only to
identify a line of reasoning which gives great weight to what is called here "political process values"
at the expense of "Bill of Rights values." To the extent that these cases rest on political process values,
they are the logical extension of the "liberal" decisions of the New Deal and not reflective of entrenched
"conservatism."
14. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRST
HAND ACCOUNT (1991); Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 45; Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court
in Transition: Assessing the Legitimacy ofthe Leading Legal Institution, 79 Ky. L.J. 317 (1991); Charles
A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409 (1991); Richard Lacayo, Confessions That Were
Taboo Are Now Just a Technicality, TIME, Apr. 8, 1991, at 26.
15. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 62.
16. I1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 300.
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Part I discusses the conflicting ideals within the
Constitution-individual autonomy and democratic political
processes-and suggests that the belief in "natural rights," implicit in Bill
of Rights values, has not really been rejected at all, even by legal
scholars. Rather, it is alive and well in (almost) all of us.
Part II contains a brief overview of the New Deal revolution 7 on the
Supreme Court. This is an Qft-told tale and it is not retold here in its full
richness.' 8 However, some attention is given to background, including
the Lochner Era, and the ideological motivations of the Roosevelt
Administration.' 9 Part II also briefly analyzes the arguments of "legal
realism," which helped bring about the New Deal revolution -on the Court,
as well as these arguments' more modern extensions, which may be called
"political choice" or "baseline analysis." The focus of Part II is, however,
a somewhat contrarian discussion of several familiar Supreme Court
decisions of the 1930s.2" These New Deal Era cases are generally held
out as representing the Court's "capitulation" to the Roosevelt
Administration's political agenda,2 as well as redefining the terms and
values of modern constitutional jurisprudence in line with modern
"liberal" interpretation.
22
Part III discusses four key decisions of the modern Court which raise
issues of individual autonomy versus state control: Bowers v.
Hardwick,23 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,24 Employment Division,
17. This term has become generic. Recent examples of its use can be found in Edley Christopher,
Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 582 (1991), and
Reich, supra note 14, at 1409 n.1.
18. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6-22 (1984)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, RECONSTUCTING]; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (199 1) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE]; JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 184-203 (1980);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-5 to -7, at 434-55 (2d ed. 1988); Daniel
0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 216-18 (1987) (arguing that
Bowers represented the end of a revival of substantive due process and finding parallels with the 1930s);
Sunstein, supra note 11.
19. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 421, 422 (discussing the New Deal belief in energetic
national government and the desire to protect public officials from partisan
pressures).
20. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
21. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 18; SIEGAN, supra note 18, at 184-90;
TRIBE, supra note 18, § 8-7, at 450; Sunstein, supra note 6.
22. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 8-5 to -7, at 442-55.
23. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
24. IlIS. Ct. 2456 (1991).
[Vol. 68:525
THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 5 and Rust v. Sullivan.2 s Part
III also documents the growth of the Positive State27 since the New Deal
and suggests that Smith and Rust may demonstrate the impossibility of
maintaining the judicial double standard between economic and
noneconomic legislation. Part III concludes that each case, in its own way,
reflects the modern Court's adoption of political process values.
In Part IV, the New Deal cases from Part II are compared to the modern
cases discussed in Part III. The comparison identifies important
similarities and raises questions about the accuracy and utility of
characterizing the decisions as "liberal" or "conservative." Part IV also
emphasizes the distinction, which grew out of Carolene Products2 and
other New Deal decisions, between economic activities and noneconomic
activities. Part IV concludes that the modern cases reflect the same
political process values as the New Deal cases and that the modern cases
may portend a disintegration of the celebrated economic/noneconomic
distinction.
This Note concludes that Madison's fears of two hundred years ago
were well founded. It suggests that Bill of Rights values will regain their
leading position in the Supreme Court's jurisprudential hierarchy only
when our prevailing notion of the "good society" incorporates the
recognition of individual diversity and liberty and rejects the idea that
there can be a political "final solution."
I. CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL IDEALS
A. The Political Process and the Bill of Rights
The Constitution contains ambiguous provisions and reflects conflicting
values.29 Most of the original document is devoted to defining structure
and process. These provisions do not address what the government will
do, only how it will do it. The premise, as every schoolchild learns, is that
separation of powers among competing units of variously representative
25. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
26. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
27. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984) (arguing that the New Deal inaugurated the emergence of the Positive
State and that all rights are positive in a Positive State).
28. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The two important distinctions
drawn by Justice Stone in the Carolene Products decision are discussed infra at Part II.E.
29. See, e.g., HENRY S. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MiNoRrry RIGHTs 4-5 (1950); ELY,
supra note 18, at 76-77; Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1043; Reich, supra note 14, at 1411.
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
bodies will ensure: first, that only those proposals obtaining broad
approval will be enacted, and second, no single faction or interest group
will gain domination over the entire governmental process.30
Other provisions of the Constitution, however, especially the Bill of
Rights, address what the government may or may not do. They designate
certain areas that are "off limits" to the central government, regardless of
how "democratic" the process utilized and regardless of how large a
majority believes that it knows the "correct" solution to a problem.3'
These provisions include:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.32
... [T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . .34
No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.35
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 6
There may be reasoned disagreement about the exact definitions of some
of these terms and, therefore, disagreement as to the exact contours and
scope of these prohibitions. There cannot be, however, disagreement as to
whether these words are intended to limit the reach of government power.
The constraints on what the government may constitutionally do are not
limited to the Bill of Rights. Article I, sections 9 and 10, contains a
30. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
31. Because this Note argues that a constitutional interpretation emphasizing political process values
essentially rejects constitutional limits on the power of the political majority, it is important to identify
the words in the Constitution that must be overcome by such an interpretation.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. U.S. CoNsT. amend. II.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See also TRIBE, supra note 18, § 11-3, at 569-70 (recalling the history
of the Ninth Amendment and the framers' fear "that rights which were not singled out were intended
to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure") (quoting
I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
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listing of other acts prohibited to the federal and state governments. These
prohibitions include: suspension of the "Writ of Habeas Corpus ... unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion,"37 passage of "Bill[s] of
Attainder" or "ex post facto laws,' 3' and laying of taxes or duties "on
articles exported from any state. ' 39 Also, "No State shall . . . pass any
... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."40  Some of these
limitations are absolute-"Congress shall make no law"-while others are
conditional-"without due process of law."
It is important to recognize that there are constitutional limitations on
the power of government even though ours is a "democratic" government.
In its most fundamental sense, the Constitution is the set of rules
according to which we determine when citizens may legitimately use
force-to compel behavior or confiscate property through the use or threat
of physical violence-against their fellow citizens. The Constitution
authorizes and legitimizes the use of force by some citizens, acting
through and as the state, against other citizens. The provisions of the
Constitution that deal with what the state may do, therefore, comprise a
division of power between the state and the individual. These provisions
answer the question, "Who decides?" To the extent the state is authorized,
the answer is that the majority of designated electors decides, acting
through the democratic political process. To the extent the state is not
authorized, the answer is that the individual may decide for herself.4'
The state is not authorized, for example, to establish a state religion, to
restrict free travel among the states, or to limit career choices based on
aptitude tests. The state is authorized, on the other hand, to establish
safety and performance standards for automobiles and to extract taxes
from earned income. The state is also authorized to use force to
implement its decisions.4 2
37. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
41. This Note does not address the extent to which the political process actually reflects the wishes
of the arithmetic majority of designated electors. It is assumed that such majority has the power to
effectuate its desires within those areas subject to majority control. To the extent the majority does not
exercise that power, the resulting policies are established with the tacit approval and/or sufferance of
the majority. This is not to say that corruption and rent seeking do not occur. The term "political
majority" is used to distinguish that group or groups able to wield the power of the state through the
political process from the numerical majority of electors.
42. If this seems elementary, that is good. It means that the idea of limits on the power of the state
is taken for granted. In light of some recent Supreme Court decisions, however, it is very important to
establish that such limits do, and ought to, exist. See infra part III.
1993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Thus, the very scheme of the Constitution establishes a tension between
two highly valued ideals. The first is the ideal of individual autonomy;
that is, the belief that every person should have a certain sphere of
activity free from the control of others; that every person has "certain
unalienable rights";4 3 that these rights are "pre-political" and are not the
construct of any government, but that governments are established to
protect such rights; that the Constitution establishes an island of
enumerated state powers within a sea of individual rights, so that any
residuum of power resides with the individual; that citizens have equal
legal status so that some citizens may not be used by the state to benefit
others; that rights are a function of a person's humanity so that no citizen
can have rights that others do not. This Note refers to this ideal as Bill of
Rights values.
The second ideal in the Constitution, an ideal in conflict with Bill of
Rights values, is that of democratic self-government by "The People": the
belief that matters affecting the whole of society should be decided
"democratically" by rule of the political majority; that rights do not inhere
in persons, but are the construct of the state; that burdens and benefits
should be allocated in the interest of fairness and justice for all, as the
political majority defines "fairness" and "justice"; that the Constitution
establishes a sea of state power while carving out an island of enumerated
individual rights, so that any residuum of power resides in the state. This
Note refers to this ideal as political process values.
The fundamental distinction between Bill of Rights values and political
process values goes beyond presumptions favoring the state or the
individual. Use of political process values inevitably enlarges the field of
state power by requiring textual support for exemptions from it.44
Because the original constitutional scheme never contemplated such a
presumption of state power,45 such textual support is available only for
those few ambiguously worded matters singled out as examples by the
framers of the Bill of Rights. Even when textual support is available, the
Supreme Court, when applying political process values, will often insist
on weighing the individual's interest against that of the state. Such
balancing occurs notwithstanding the unequivocal text of the constitutional
43. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
44. Reich, supra note 14, at 1415.
45. Randy E. Bamett, James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989); RUTLAND, supra note 7, at 132-33; SIEGAN, supra note 18, at 29-
30; TRIBE, supra note 18, § 11-3, at 570.
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provision which strongly suggests that the framers have already engaged
in a balancing of interests and decided in favor of the individual.46
B. Natural Rights
In claiming that the values of individual autonomy are represented by
the Bill of Rights, it is necessary to address the contention that so-called
"natural rights" theories have been uniformly rejected by legal scholars
and the courts.47 It seems to be a given among legal scholars today that
the notion of "natural rights" is an anachronism. When Judge Clarence
Thomas was nominated to be a Justice of the Supreme Court, for example,
he was ridiculed for having expressed a belief in "natural rights" in some
of his writings.4" Such beliefs seem to label a person as "out of the
mainstream" and "not to be taken seriously". To be sure, "natural rights"
are easily confused with a version of "natural law" that advances the
notion of some quasi-religious "natural order of things," handed down on
stone tablets, or written in a holy book. To the extent that "natural rights"
are derived from this conception of "natural law," they seldom claim
serious consideration by legal or other scholars. Too many true evils, from
slavery, military conquest, and sexism, to censorship and racial
segregation, have been perpetrated in the name of such "natural law.
49
There is another, secular, conception of "natural rights," however, in
which virtually all Americans would affirm a belief. This is the belief that
every person, just by virtue of his or her humanity, has a dignity, an
integrity, a value, that commands respect. It is this humanist conception
of "natural rights" that makes one deplore, for example, the very idea of
slavery. The thought that at one time in this country some human beings
could use other human beings against their will is both embarrassing and
repugnant to us all. That we deplore the practice, even though it was
perfectly legal, reflects our belief in some "higher value," some "natural
right" of human beings, that is superior to the political process. It is a
belief in this conception of "natural rights" that would make most
Americans profess that there are some acts that persons ought not do to
other persons and, therefore, governments ought not do to their citizens.
46. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 65-70.
48. See, e.g., David Margolick, Sizing Up the Talk of "Natural Law, " N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 1991,
at A22; Natural Law, Then and Now, N.Y. TiMm, Sept. 12, 1991, at A24.
49. This is not to denigrate religious belief as a basis for personal morality, but only to recognize
that such beliefs, for the reasons stated in the text, are not generally regarded today as an appropriate
basis for political morality.
1993]
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When legal scholars condemn the decisions of the Supreme Court, they
often base their judgments on their belief in nontextual, "natural right"
values that inform their interpretation of the constitutional text and limit
the reach of the state. Those who reject the notion of "natural rights" have
no difficulty appealing to their own versions of extra-textual standards and
values. Rather than call these ideals "natural rights," they may be called
"moral values," or "justice," or "fairness," or a "vision" of the "good
society."
The exact definition of these "natural rights"-just exactly what limits
they place on government-is, it seems to this observer, the central
question of constitutional law. The essential point is, however, that almost
everyone agrees that some limits exist outside of the constitutional text.
The disagreement is about the extent and contours of those limits, and the
values that determine them.
C. Majoritarianism
The conflicting ideals within the Constitution are also captured in the
notion of majoritarianism. The concept, like democracy itself, has at least
two dimensions. On the one hand, the term means that government should
reflect the desires of the majority, that is, "majority rule." This "majority
rule" aspect of majoritarianism might be called its vertical dimension
because it describes the linkage that should convey the wishes of the
people to their representatives in government. If one were to draw an
organizational chart of political society, for example, the people would
probably be spread across the bottom of the page and various levels of
government arrayed above. In this sense, "majority rule" majoritarianism
is vertical because it refers to communication from the bottom to the top.
The other dimension of majoritarianism concerns the subject matter with
respect to which the majority should rule. In a debate as to whether a
particular matter should be left to individual decision or decided for all
by majority vote, those advocating a majority vote are called majoritarian.
Because it concerns the scope or width of "majority rule" application, this
aspect of majoritarianism might be called its horizontal dimension.
The dual dimensions of majoritarianism mirror the dual constitutional
ideals of Bill of Rights values and political process values. Political
process values emphasize the vertical aspect of majoritarianism. The
government should represent the will of the people and democratic
processes should be enforced to ensure that it does. Bill of Rights values
emphasize limiting the scope of horizontal majoritarianism. The
government should, indeed, represent the will of the people, but only with
[Vol. 68:525
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respect to certain matters. The width of the majority's reach must be
limited.5 °
D. Negative and Positive Rights
An example that illustrates the fault line between Bill of Rights values
and political process values is our society's ambivalent conception of what
we call "rights." The conception of rights that flows from Bill of Rights
values is often referred to as "negative" rights.5 "Negative" rights
require nothing of the state or other citizens except forbearance. The
familiar freedoms of speech, press, and religion, for example, are all
"negative" rights, because no act by another is required to realize them.
Under the logic of Bill of Rights values, the state exists to protect these
negative rights by providing "defense" mechanisms such as a criminal
justice system, a civil judiciary, and a national defense. Philosopher
Robert Nozick has expressed the conception of the state that is derived
from Bill of Rights values:
[A] minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against
force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified;...
any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced
to do certain things, and is unjustified; [and] . . . the minimal state is
inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications are that the
state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some
citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for
their own good or protection.5
2
The notion of "positive" rights, on the other hand, is a creature of
political process values. To have a "positive" right is to have a claim
against the state, that is, other citizens, for some good or service other
than the "defense" mechanisms mentioned above. A "positive" right is an
50. But see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). Amar
argues that the main function of the Bill of Rights is "not to impede popular majorities, but to empower
them" through structural interdependence with constitutional processes, and is, therefore, an essentially
majoritarian document. Id. at 1132. Amar does not distinguish the two aspects of majoritarianism
discussed in the text. To the extent that he is suggesting that the Bill of Rights furthers the notion of
vertical majoritarianism, that is, that it helps to ensure whatever actions taken by the state are consistent
with the majority's desires, his thesis is not controversial.
51. See generally BERLIN, supra note 1, 118-72; TIBOR R. MACHAN, INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR
RIGHTS (1989); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS
(1980); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271 (1990); David
P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986); Kreimer, supra
note 27; Roger Pilon, Ordering Rights Consistently: Or What We Do Or Do Not Have Rights To, 13
GA. L. REV. 1171 (1979).
52. NOZiCK, supra note 51, at ix (1974) (emphasis in original).
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"entitlement." Such rights involve the affirmative obligation of others,
enforceable by the state. If a person asserts a positive right to adequate
health care, for example, she means that the state is obligated to provide
such health care by purchasing or taking it from other citizens.53
The distinction between a "negative" right and a "positive" right can be
seen in the difference between "having" a right and "exercising" that
right. If a person's right to own an automobile, for example, is
characterized as a "negative" right, their right is not violated if they
cannot afford to exercise it because, for example, they cannot afford the
price of an automobile. If the right to own an automobile is considered
"positive," however, it does not matter if one cannot afford the price of
an automobile; the state is obliged to provide it.54 Similarly, if a
person's right to be a medical doctor is characterized as "negative," we
do not say that her right has been violated if her academic credentials
preclude acceptance to a medical school. The right to acquire a good or
service through free exchange in the market is considerably different from
the right to have such goods or services provided by the state.
It is important to understand that "negative" rights and "positive" rights
are mutually exclusive and irreconcilable conceptions.55 The existence
of a "positive" right necessarily negates the existence of a "negative"
right. This is so because the provision of a "positive" right always
requires the use of force by the state against other citizens, either by
coercing the service or by confiscating property, both being violations of
"negative" rights.56 Further, recognition of the state's ability to create
53. In the normal course, such entitlements are provided to those claiming them by taking money
from others and giving it to the claimant in order to purchase the claimed good or service.
54. Pilon, supra note 51, at 1190.
55. BERLIN, supra note I, at 166. This is not to say that nonpolitical positive rights, such as those
arising from a consensual contract, may not coexist with negative political rights. Indeed, such
consensual obligations depend on the existence of negative political rights.
56. Many commentators question the distinction between "negative" and "positive" rights. See, e.g.,
Bandes, supra note 51; Currie, supra note 51; Kreimer, supra note 27. But see BERLIN, supra note 1;
MACHAN, supra note 51; NOZICK, supra note 51. Questioning the existence of "negative" rights is
analogous to questioning the existence of limitations on the power of the state. The questioning
commentators often base their objections on their observation that whether a right is "negative" or
"positive" depends on the choice of "baseline" from which one measures change. See Ackerman, supra
note 6; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 503. Their unexpressed premise is that any "baseline" chosen by
"society" is legitimate. Since "society," in this context, is the equivalent of the political majority, the
premise is analogous to placing no limits on state power. If it is posited, for example, that private
property is a construct of the state, that is, presumably, that property did not exist before governments,
then the "defense" of private property is not a "negative" right but a "positive" one of resource
allocation. Under this approach, the conventional descriptions of "negative" rights are misconceived
because they adopt the "common law ordering of existing wealth and property" as the baseline from
which to measure. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 423. To the extent that one accepts the premise that
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"positive" rights necessarily requires recognition of the state's ability to
violate "negative" rights. If "negative" rights may be legitimately violated
by the political process, they are not rights at all.
An interesting rivalry seems to be developing between advocates of
"negative" rights and "positive" rights over their respective proprietary
interests in the Ninth Amendment.57 Advocates of Bill of Rights values
see the amendment as justification for limiting state power. Advocates of
political process values want to use the amendment as textual support to
justify expansion of the state through the "discovery" of additional
"positive" rights.5 8
There are, then, two distinct and conflicting ideals within the
Constitution: The ideal of personal autonomy-Bill of Rights values-and
the ideal of democratic self-government-political process values. The
provisions of the Constitution that address what the state may do comprise
a division of power between the two ideals. Although political process
values necessarily reject nonprocedural, that is, substantive, limits on the
power of the state, that there are, and ought to be, such limits is not
controversial for most people. The exact nature and extent of those limits,
however, are.
II. THE NEW DEAL CASES
A. Background
In order to properly understand the significance of the changes that
occurred in constitutional jurisprudence during the New Deal Era, a brief
review of pre-New Deal constitutional law is necessary. By the beginning
of the twentieth century, Supreme Court jurisprudence had evolved into
a recognition of distinct and mutually exclusive spheres of autonomy for
the state governments, the federal government, and the individual. 9 In
the legitimate power of the state is unlimited, the distinction between "negative" and "positive" rights
is, indeed, meaningless. See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
Advocates of "negative" rights and Bill of Rights values might suggest that Thomas Hobbes and John
Locke were the original "baseline" theorists. Their state-of-nature baselines, however, attributed full
humanity, including property, to pre-political mankind, even though their pre-political lives were thought
by Hobbes to be "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
(MacMillan ed. 1989); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (Hackett ed. 1980).
57. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 45; TRIBE, supra note 18, § 11-3, at 569-72. The Ninth
Amendment reads as follows: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
58. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 11-3, at 569-72.
59. Id. § 8-1, at 561-66.
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spite of the decision in The Slaughter-House Cases60 in 1873, the Court
came to see itself as protector of individual rights against government
interference, relying primarily on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 ' The period, roughly from 1905 to the New
Deal cases of the 1930s, is known as the Lochner Era, taking its name
from a case decided in 190562 in which the Court struck down New York
state legislation limiting working hours for bakers. During an era of
"progressive" politics and booming economic expansion, the Court had
many opportunities to delineate the constitutional division of power
between the state and the individual. Even though this period of Supreme
Court history is known for striking down "social" legislation in the name
of substantive due process, more challenged laws were upheld than were
struck down.63 The Supreme Court did recognize, however, that there
were limits to government power under the Constitution and that one of
the Court's functions was to enforce those limits.
When Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected President in 1932, he came
to office with a mandate to "do something" about the depressed state of
the economy. The resulting New Deal of the Roosevelt Administration not
only transformed the way Americans thought about the federal
government, it transformed the role of government altogether. Even today,
the New Deal is synonymous with an activist, socially reform-minded
state, run by technically trained bureaucrats, with overwhelming popular
support.
Part of the New Dealers' agenda upon coming to office was a reform of
the country's fundamental constitutional scheme. 4 They understood that
they could not complete their political program under the existing
interpretation of the Constitution. 5 What occurred was nothing less than
a de facto amendment of the Constitution by extra-Constitutional means,
an amendment that shifted the line marking the division of power between
the state and the individual dramatically in favor of the state. 6 The
extent of the New Dealers' success is still visible in the modern Supreme
Court's decisions.
60. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (declining to invoke the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate Louisiana laws granting slaughter-house monopolies to local
companies).
61. TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 6-11 to -16, at 432-50.
62. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
63. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 8-2, at 567.
64. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 423.
65. Id.
66. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCrING, supra note 18; Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1051-56.
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With massive popular and legislative support, the New Deal's only
impediment to total victory was the Supreme Court.67 As is now well
known, the Court ultimately "capitulated" to the political pressure of the
Roosevelt Administration, despite the failure of Roosevelt's infamous
court-packing scheme.6"
The purpose of this Note is not, however, to retell that story, but to
examine some of the key "liberal" decisions that comprised the
capitulation and to compare them to modern "conservative" decisions. The
major decisions of the 1930s signaled a shift away from Bill of Rights
values to political process values. At the time, the shift seemed to be
limited to "legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions. 69 The
cases discussed in the following sections illustrate how the New Deal
Court adopted political process values, at the expense of Bill of Rights
values, as its basis for constitutional interpretation following Roosevelt's
election.
B. Nebbia v. New York
The first example of the Court adopting a political process argument to
expand the power of the state over individual rights, and surely one of the
clearest, is its early New Deal decision in Nebbia v. New York. 70 The
case was decided in 1934, well before the period of intense political
pressure on the Court from the Roosevelt Administration. The majority
opinion is notable for its broad language and abject deference to the New
York state legislature's conception of the "public welfare."
In 1933, the New York state legislature adopted legislation to set
minimum prices for the retail sale of milk. Mr. Nebbia, a small retail
grocer, "was convicted of a crime for selling his own
property-wholesome milk-in the ordinary course of business at a price
satisfactory to himself and the customer."'7 Nebbia sued, claiming the
law violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.72
The Court, in a five to four decision, sustained the law as a "necessary
and appropriate exertion of [the state's] police power. ' 73 Quickly
67. See generally Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1052; Sunstein, supra note 6.
68. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122-24 (12th ed. 1991).
69. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1937).
70. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
71. Id. at 543-44 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 515.
73. Id. at 525.
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disposing of Nebbia's Equal Protection claim,74 the Court devoted most
of its attention to justifying the New York legislature's action under the
Due Process Clause:
The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the
Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental
regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion
of the admitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished
by methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due
process ... demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."
According to the Nebbia Court, a state may lawfully deprive a citizen of
life, liberty, or property by clearing this very small hurdle.
7 6
The broad language used by the Nebbia Court shows the degree of
deference at work:
[I]n the absence of constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare .... The courts are without authority either to declare such
policy, or ... to override it .... [T]he legislature is primarily the
judge of the necessity of such an enactment, [and] every possible
presumption is in favor of its validity.77
Justice McReynolds' dissent emphasized Bill of Rights values in
asserting that Mr. Nebbia's private interests should be given greater
weight. By attacking the efficacy and utility of the price-fixing law and
74. "There is... no showing that the order placed him at a disadvantage, or in fact affected him
adversely, and this alone is fatal to the claim of denial of equal protection." Id. at 521. The Court does
not explain how the higher required price for milk did not affect Nebbia "adversely," even though the
higher price would inevitably result in less milk sold.
75. Id. at 525.
76. Id. at 524-25. Indeed, the means hurdle of this test became even less daunting over time,
moving from "real and substantial" to "rational," and finally to "hypothetical." See GUNTHER, supra note
68, at 432-65. It is not one of the purposes of this Note to examine the mechanics of various Supreme
Court balancing techniques, but to point out that any of these tests involve, either explicitly or implicitly,.
weighing the private interests of individual citizens against the "public" interests of the state. The
significant variable this Note emphasizes is not the mechanism used, but the choice the Justices make
to accord greater weight to the interests of some citizens-those in the political majority, expressing
their interest through the political process-as opposed to the legitimate interests of other citizens-the
minorities who happen to be losers in the political process-even when "harm to others" is admittedly
not a consideration.
If "due process" is served by nothing more than a majority vote in a state legislature, as the Nebbia
Court seems to say, the Due Process Clause is rendered meaningless. Such an interpretation of any
language in the Constitution as ineffectual cannot be reconciled with Chief Justice John Marshall's
admonition in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (1803), that "[i]t cannot be presumed
that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect." Id.
77. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537-38.
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showing that the political majority does not always serve the "public
interest," the dissent sought to lower the value accorded the state's
action.78 The law, if it benefited anyone for more than a very short time,
aided approximately 130,000 milk producers in rural New York. The
twelve million or so milk consumers in the state were certainly not
benefited.7 9
C. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell
In 1934, the same year that Nebbia was decided, Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell" offered the Court another opportunity to weigh
the private interests of some citizens against the "public" interests of
other citizens as reflected in the act of a state legislature. The Minnesota
state legislature had passed a law establishing an "emergency" moratorium
on home mortgage payments in response to the severe economic
conditions of the Depression. The law was temporary, with a specific
expiration date in 1935, and altered only some of the underlying
obligations of the parties or the remedies available to them. It allowed
borrowers to delay payments for a period of time without losing their
homes through mortgage foreclosure. The law was challenged, not as a
violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but as a
violation of the Contracts Clause.8' The challenge under the Contracts
Clause is noteworthy because, unlike the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Contracts
Clause is not subject to the "due process" qualification. Notwithstanding
the text of the Clause, a majority of the Court had no difficulty finding
that the "public interest" outweighed the individual's interests. In fact, the
majority opinion announced a test for the Contracts Clause that is even
more deferential than the test for "due process": "The question is ...
whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures
78. Id. at 539 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
79. Nebbia, like many other "economic regulation" cases (Lochner, for example) exposes the
operation of "special interest groups" seeking to gain legislatively what they cannot gain in the
marketplace, that is, to gain by coercion what they cannot gain by persuasion. These cases raise
questions about the definition of "public interest" in the allocation of burdens and benefits.
80. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
81. Id. "No State shall... pass any Law... impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 10. As the Contracts Clause illustrates, not all Bill of Rights values are found in the first 10
amendments to the Constitution. See supra notes 31-40.
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taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end." 2 A very low standard,
it seems, for a provision that on its face is unequivocal. 3
The Blaisdell majority recognized that it was balancing "public" and
''private" interests: "It is manifest ... that there has been a growing
appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a
rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare." '8 4 The
Blaisdell decision shows that the changes in constitutional jurisprudence
that occurred during the 1930s were not limited to a reinterpretation of the
Due Process Clause. The "public interest" became a counterweight to even
the most unequivocal constitutional prohibitions, at least where economic
regulation was concerned.85
Although Nebbia and Blaisdell showed an increasing willingness on the
part of the Supreme Court to accept and give substantial weight to
political process values, there was still considerable resistance to much of
the Roosevelt Administration's economic program. Only after intense
political pressure, including Roosevelt's court-packing scheme, as well as
some personnel changes,86 did the Court "capitulate." Even then, it was
only with regard to so-called "economic" regulation that the political
process argument was given full force.87
82. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438.
83. Except for a brief quiver of life in the 1970s, the Contracts Clause has remained a dead letter.
See generally GUNTHER, supra note 68, at 484-490; Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the
Contracts Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703 (1984) (arguing that the Contracts Clause extends substantial
protection to economic liberties against legislative and judicial interference, and that current
interpretation is wrong and indefensible).
84. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442. As the Court speaks of "individual" and "public" interests, it is
important to keep in mind that the competing interests involved are not of a different order or
dimension. All interests are, at bottom, "individual," since they are all interests of human beings, either
singularly or in groups. The interests that are labeled "public" are simply those interests that, due to the
superior number of adherents, are expressed through the political process. The Blaisdell Court gave no
consideration to the possibility that the unequivocal language of the Contracts Clause reflects a weighing
of competing interests by the framers themselves, a process they believed favored the individual.
It is also helpful to keep in mind that when the "public" interest wins, the state is authorized to use
force against the losing "private" interest-force necessary to coerce compliance with the will of the
"public." In the end, the only difference between a street gang mugging and economic regulation in the
"public interest" is the size of the body politic.
85. Id. at 398. The Blaisdell decision is especially noteworthy when one considers that the State
of Minnesota could have achieved its purpose of relief in alternative ways not violative of the Contracts
Clause. The state could have, for example, simply purchased the mortgages from the financial
institutions.
86. President Roosevelt appointed Hugo Black, a Democratic senator from Alabama, to the Court
in 1937, replacing Justice VanDevanter, who had retired.
87. See infra part II.E.
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D. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
Two cases, one decided in 1937 and the other in 1938, illustrate the new
perspective of the Court. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish," the Court
was required to decide the constitutionality of a minimum wage law for
women in the state of Washington. The law was challenged under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a violation of the hotel
owners' liberty interests. The Court reversed doctrine of prior cases89
and upheld the Washington law. Again, the Court laid down a very
deferential standard of due process: "[R]egulation that is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is
due process."90
The manner in which Chief Justice Hughes characterized the state's
interest in West Coast Hotel is particularly interesting in today's climate
of race and gender sensitivity. The "interest of the community" went
beyond the mere economic well-being of its female citizens. The Chief
Justice stated that their "physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place [women] at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence" and they are legitimately "an object of public interest and
care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."91
One way of characterizing the Court's abandonment of substantive due
process is to say that the Court abandoned the application of any
meaningful scrutiny to legislative objectives. While the Court invoked
rhetoric of "arbitrary and capricious," the reality, at least as far as
"ordinary commercial" transactions were concerned, was "anything goes.
The paternalistic, protection-for-your-own-good justification advanced in
West Coast Hotel shows where a constitutional legislative blank check can
lead during a period of extraordinary social pressures. Because of their
"physical structure" and "maternal functions," said the Court, women are
a legitimate "object of public interest" to be protected for the common
88. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
89. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding invalid under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment a District of Columbia minimum wage law).
90. West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 391.
91. Id. at 394 (emphasis added) (quoting Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)). Chief Justice
Hughes' conception of the "interests of the community" as incorporating "the strength and vigor of the
race" was being echoed during this same period in Europe where the rights of minorities were also being
sacrificed in the "interests of the community." This is not to impugn the motives of Chief Justice
Hughes, but only to point out how seemingly high-minded phrases and good intentions can be used in
the interest of very unworthy objectives.
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good of "the race." It is not a very great leap from Chief Justice Hughes'
majority opinion to The Handmaid's Tale.92
E. United States v. Carolene Products
United States v. Carolene Products9a is probably the most cited
decision from the New Deal Era. Its popularity stems not from the facts
or the holding of the case, but from the way Justice Stone sought to
distinguish its "ordinary" circumstances from other, less mundane
situations. Possibly anticipating the appeal of the political process
argument in noncommercial settings, Justice Stone drew a distinction in
his famous fourth footnote between "legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions" '94 and "legislation [which] appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments . . . ."9 This was only the first of two distinctions
Justice Stone would draw. The second distinction, entirely within footnote
four, was one between "legislation which restricts ... political processes"
and "most other legislation."96 It is this second, "political process,"
distinction that truly sets the decision apart, since the first, "ordinary
commercial transaction," distinction only confirmed the Court's
abandonment of scrutiny in the field of economic regulation. This
distinction was already evident from earlier cases like West Coast Hotel.
It is, of course, the "political process" distinction, combined with Justice
Stone's emphasis on its application to "discrete and insular minorities,""
that is referred to by Professor Ely when lie writes of "'participational'
goals of broadened access to the processes and bounty of representative
government .... "9'
For all of its fame, footnote four of Carolene Products is very curious.
Justice Stone implies, for example, that "legislation affecting ordinary
92. MARGARET E. ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1985) (involving a fictional future society
where environmental damage has rendered most women unable to conceive, and those women that are
able to conceive become "object[s] of the public interest").
93. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
94. Id. at 152.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Although Justice Stone's opinion in Carolene Products referred to religious, racial, and ethnic
minorities, the term "minority" is used in this Note in its generic sense of numerical inferiority, not in
its political sense of biological category.
98. ELY, supra note 18, at 74 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Professor Ely may also be
referring to the "ordinary commercial transaction" distinction when he uses the term "bounty" in
describing the redistributional possibilities of representative government.
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commercial transactions" is somehow exempt from the "specific
prohibitions" of the Constitution. Critics claim there is no basis in text,
logic, or history for such an exemption.99 There is, in fact, quite a lot of
support for the opposite claim, namely, the Property Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and the Contracts Clause of Article I.
In addition, Justice Stone wrote of "those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities."' 00 Unless the Justice had
countermajoritarian political processes in mind, his statement seems to
belie the logic of a democratic system, at least in its vertical majoritarian
dimension. Further, Justice Stone's conception of minorities seems to be
limited to religious, ethnic, or racial groups. 0 ' Justice Stone offered no
reason to explain why he believed the Constitution protected some
minorities but not others.
The facts of Carolene Products expose another example of commercial
interests utilizing the political process to protect themselves from the
competition of the marketplace. Carolene Products Company had devised
a way of extracting butterfat from milk and substituting an alternative
form of vegetable oil. The resulting product was virtually
indistinguishable from natural, whole milk. The "filled milk" could also
be sold at a lower price due to the additional revenue generated by selling
the butterfat separately. The "filled milk" product, then, was a lower-
priced threat to the whole milk producers' share of the market, price-
structure, and profits. The product's prospects might have been considered
especially bright during the economic hardship of the mid-1930s. 
0 2
Unfortunately for Carolene Products Company, the dairy industry had
succeeded in getting a federal law passed in 1923 banning "filled milk"
products from the market. The "findings" of the legislation, swallowed
whole by the "see-no-evil, hear-no-evil" Supreme Court,'0 3 were clearly
the creation of the milk industry lobby. The law declared, for example,
"that filled milk . . . is an adulterated article of food, injurious to the
public health, and its sale constitutes a fraud upon the public."'0 4 The
law was a thinly disguised transfer of economic resources from one
99. See, e.g., SIEGAN, supra note 18, at 189; Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic
Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 4, 25 (1987).
100. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
101. Id.
102. Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 397.
103. Id. at 428.
104. 21 U.S.C. § 62 (1923), quoted in Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 145 n.I.
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minority group, Carolene Products and other manufacturers of "filled
milk," to another minority group, the whole milk industry. 0 5
As Professor Geoffrey Miller suggests, the nature of the law upheld in
the famous case sheds considerable light on the true impact of the
distinctions drawn by Justice Stone's opinion. The nature of the interests
upheld, of which the Court could not have been ignorant, demonstrated
that the Court could no longer be expected to protect a minority-discrete,
insular, or otherwise-against "utterly unprincipled ... special interest
legislation," 0 6 and that the Court would turn a blind eye to any "public
interest" economic regulation, even when it knew that the invocation of
the "public interest" was patently false. 7 "Carolene's legacy is not
only Brown v. Board of Education, it is also the unrivaled primacy of
interest groups in American politics of the last half century."'0 8
The Carolene Products decision fairly captures what the New Deal
revolution meant to constitutional jurisprudence. The scope of
majoritarianism (that is, its horizontal aspect) was vastly widened by a
major shift of the constitutional power line in favor of the state. This is
the meaning of Carolene's first, "ordinary commercial transactions,"
distinction. In addition, the case reflects a renewed political commitment
to the representative, or vertical, aspect of majoritarianism- to ensure
that all interests, especially "discrete and insular minorities," are able to
participate fairly in the political process. This is the meaning of
Carolene's second, "political process," distinction. The benefits realized
from the strengthening of representational democracy may have been
considerably offset by the costs of weakening individual autonomy.
F. Legal Realism
It is said that the de facto amendment'0 9 of the Constitution that
occurred during the New Deal. was due to the acceptance by the Court, at
least in part, of a perspective on the law called "legal realism.""0 It is
105. The Filled Milk Act of 1923 was ultimately overturned in 1972 in Milnot Co. v. Richardson,
350 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. I11. 1972). Thirty-four years after Carolene Products, the Milnot Company,
ironically the corporate successor to Carolene Products Company, the manufacturer of Milnot filled milk
products, won its case.
106. Miller, supra note 102, at 398.
107. Id. at 399.
108. Id.
109. AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 18, at 52, 195.
110. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCrING, supra note 18, at 6-22; TIdBE, supra note 18, § 6-16, at 447;
Chemerinsky, supra note 1'l, at 66.
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not a purpose of this Note to inquire into the full depth and meaning of
"legal realism" or its intellectual descendants within modern legal
scholarship. It is necessary, however, to discuss its central idea. Professor
Tribe stated this central idea in the following way:
[T]he central notion which contributed to [the New Deal revolution
was] that even judicial enforcement of common-law rules of contract
and property represents a governmental choice with discernable
consequences for the social distribution of suffering, pleasure, and
power, [and it is] hard to avoid the realization that a judicial choice
between invalidating and upholding legislation altering the ground rules
of contract and property is nonetheless a ... political choice, one
guided by constitutional language and history but almost never wholly
determined by it."'
More recently, commentators have used the term "baseline" to convey
a similar idea, namely, that there is nothing natural about using the
"common law ordering of wealth and property" as a baseline or standard
from which to evaluate the desirability of a particular legal result." 2 In
Tribe's terms, these commentators are suggesting that the proper
"baseline" is a "political choice."
Whether the idea is expressed as "legal realism," "political" or
"governmental choice," or "baseline assumption," all of these concepts
rest on a common premise. That premise is that any choice of legal rules,
or any "ordering"" 3 that is made according to democratic processes, is
legitimate. Enforcing rights of contract and property is characterized as
a "governmental choice," just one of many "orderings" that society may
choose, any of them legitimate. In other words, the premise is that the
horizontal reach of democratic majoritarianism is unlimited by any notion
of individual autonomy. According to these values, the relevant moral unit
is "society," not individual human beings.
It is important to keep in mind that the "government" or "society"
making such choices of "ordering" is none other than our old friend the
political majority. To claim that the political majority is free to choose
whatever "ordering" it pleases is to claim that there are no limits on the
power of the democratic state. Such claims assert the superiority of
political process values over Bill of Rights values. Although many who
advance such claims are called "liberals," their arguments have nothing
to do with true liberalism. Such arguments were used to justify the
111. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 6-17, at 453.




political repression of minorities by democratic governments in Europe
during the 1930s and in the southern United States in our own recent past.
They are used today to justify repression of homosexuals and other
minorities, often under the rubric of "traditional values."
The notion of "ordering" implies that, once chosen, a particular
"ordering" becomes a static status quo. Whether the "ordering of wealth
and property" would remain static in a legal system based wholly on the
English common law remains a subject for historical speculation. To the
extent that such "ordering" is related to economic well-being today,
however, it is known that the distribution is quite volatile in the semi-
capitalist United States.'
1 4
It is beyond question that the Constitution places constraints on what the
state may do. It is also beyond question that virtually everyone, whether
"liberal" or "conservative," acknowledges that there ought to be such
constraints. To say that the constraints are no more than what the political
majority chooses for them to be is simply to beg the question." 5
The New Deal revolution in constitutional interpretation brought about
a major shift of power in favor of the political majority. The revolution
was, and is, justified by a political process argument which asserts that a
democratically elected majority has only to choose what legal rules it
wants to apply. The political majority found that its interests were served
by changing the rules so that constitutional provisions protecting property
and contract rights were "reinterpreted." A double standard was adopted
by the Supreme Court for determining which constitutional protections
would be honored and which would not. The central function of the state
ceased to be the protection of individuals from the coercion of their
neighbors, and became instead the allocation of burdens and benefits.
The Positive State' 6 was born.
114. Bruce Bartlett, A Class Structure That Won't Stay Put, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1991, at A16.
This article cites U.S. Census Bureau data from 1984 through 1988 which demonstrates substantial
volatility in year-to-year movement into and out of income categories in the U.S. economy. It also cites
a study done by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research in which movement of families
among income quintiles was tracked for the years 1971 through 1978. The study found that more than
50% of the families in the top quintile in the first year had fallen into lower quintiles seven years later,
and almost half of the families in the lowest quintile had climbed to a higher quintile during that time.
It would be interesting to investigate the relative volatility of the distribution of wealth and property
over time between socialist economies and capitalist economies.
115. A profoundly pessimistic variation of the "political choice" argument may be that it really does
not matter what "rights" we say we have because all acts of government, including protection of
"rights," must inevitably be "political." This would be a sort of political "law of the jungle," where there
is no distinction between actual state power and legitimate state power. In this form, the "political
choice" perspective might be called a description of the way democracy does work, rather than a
prescription for the way it ought to work.
116. Kreimer, supra note 27.
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III. THE MODERN CASES
The modern Supreme Court has been characterized as "conservative"
because many of its decisions have narrowed the area of individual
autonomy previously believed to be free of state control." 7 The cases
selected for discussion in this Part illustrate the Court's approach in such
personal value-laden areas as sexual and religious practices and artistic,
and not so artistic, expression. In three cases, a majority of the Court
favored imposing the rule of a state legislature, reflecting the view of the
political majority of that state, against the will of a protesting minority.
In the other case, the Court upheld a federal administrative agency's
interpretation of a federal statute and told Congress to change the statute
if it did not like the agency's interpretation.
A. Bowers v. Hardwick
Bowers v. Hardwick,"' decided in 1986, represents the ascendancy of
the political process consensus on the Court. It has also been called the
second end of substantive due process." 9 In addition, the case may mark
the beginning of the end of the Carolene Products footnote four double
standard, which calls for a higher level of judicial scrutiny to legislation
affecting the political representation of minorities, but abandons any
serious scrutiny for rights not protected by the "specific prohibitions" of
the Constitution.
20
Michael Hardwick was arrested under a Georgia law criminalizing acts
of sodomy between consenting adults. Even though the Georgia prosecutor
chose not to prosecute the case, Hardwick brought an action challenging
the constitutionality of the law. Hardwick claimed that sodomy was
protected activity under the right of privacy doctrine developed in the line
of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut12 ' and running through
Roe v. Wade.
2 2
117. See, e.g., FIED, supra note 14; Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 45; Reich, supra note 14;
Smith, supra note 14; Lacayo, supra note 14.
118. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
119. Conkle, supra note 18.
120. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
121. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law criminalizing the use of birth control
materials by married persons was a violation of the Constitutional right of privacy emanating from the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights).
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a Texas law criminalizing the procurement of an abortion
as violating the right of privacy).
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The Court, in a five to four decision, rejected Hardwick's claim,
refusing to extend the right of privacy to cover sodomy between
consenting adults. The rather short majority opinion, written by Justice
White, is remarkable in two ways. First, the opinion relies on traditional
moral norms of the political majority as reflected in state legislation as
justification to uphold such legislation.' As the dissent, written by
Justice Blackmun and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
easily pointed out, a large part of the Supreme Court's business has been
striking down such legislative reflections of society's traditional
values.'24 The majority opinion did not find it necessary to explain how
it distinguished legislative proscription of sodomy from similar
proscriptions of interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 25 of racial
integration in public schools in Brown v. Board of Education,126 of or
abortion in Roe v. Wade.127
From the perspective of this commentator, the distinction between the
decisions invoked by the dissent and the majority opinion in Bowers is
one of conflicting constitutional values-the earlier decisions cited by the
dissent are based on Bill of Rights values, while the Bowers majority
opinion is based on political process values. In Loving, the right of
individuals to marry whomever they choose, including a member of a
different race, was held judicially superior to the belief of the political
majority of Virginia that miscegenation was wrong. Bill of Rights values
dictated that individuals decide for themselves whom to marry. In Brown,
the right of black children not to be segregated from white children in
public schools was held judicially superior to the segregationist views of
the political majority of Kansas. In Roe, the right of a woman to obtain
an abortion was held superior to the beliefs of the political majority of
Texas. Bill of Rights values dictated that a woman should decide for
herself.
The second way in which the Bowers opinion is remarkable is its
explicit renunciation of substantive due process. 121 In one striking
123. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 94 n.218.
124. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
126. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. Conkle, supra, note 18, at 216. In this context, substantive due process may be considered a
manifestation of Bill of Rights values. Professor Conkle stops short of calling Bowers an explicit
renunciation of substantive due process. He does call the decision "deviant" compared to other privacy
cases and says it may be a "first step" in the eventual repudiation of substantive due process. Id. at 237.
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paragraph, the Bowers majority expressed how strongly it felt the pull of
the political process logic from fifty years before:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to
discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That
this is so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the
Executive and the Court in the 1930's [sic], which resulted in the
repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed
on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive
reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the
category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary
necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country
without express constitutional authority. The claimed right pressed on
us today falls far short of overcoming this resistance." 9
This remarkable paragraph demonstrates that the threat of political
power over the Court is much more than a dim echo of the 1930s. Just
when a more principled and courageous stand by the Court is needed to
resist the power of a political majority with a popular Executive, the logic
of the political process argument becomes very persuasive. The paragraph
captures a distinctive feature of the political process interpretation of the
Constitution, namely, that individual rights must have a textual basis in
the Constitution and, lacking such basis, the state is presumed to retain
residual power. The right of an individual to decide for herself must be
found on a textual island carved out by the framers. Those who would
emphasize Bill of Rights values would say that the Court is asking the
wrong question. Rather than seek textual justification for individual rights,
the Court must find textual justification for the asserted governmental
power. Under political process values, the presumption favors the state.
Under Bill of Rights values, the presumption favors the citizen.
The last three sentences of the paragraph assert that when the Court
recognizes limits on the power of the state-"redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental"-it usurps the "authority to govern"
from the legislature. This phjcaseology equates the "authority to govern"
with the authority to decide what is governed. The premise is that this
"authority" to define what is governed properly belongs to the
democratically elected legislature, even though such "authority to govern"
is equivalent to the legislature deciding the limits of its own power. If this
129. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
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is the correct reading of this paragraph, the modern Court effectively
repudiates the very conception of constitutionally limited government, as
well as a large part of its own role in that government. Political process
values prevail.
The dissenters in Bowers still clung to Bill of Rights values, at least for
noneconomic activities, and saw the case as "about 'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,'
namely, 'the right to be let alone.""' 3
The Supreme Court in Bowers declined to apply the same principles it
had found persuasive in Griswold and Roe.' 3 ' The only justification
offered for declining to extend the right of privacy was that most people
found the conduct in question "immoral." The same observation could
have been made, of course, in all the other privacy cases. Birth control,
nonmarital sexual relations, and abortion have all been considered
"immoral" by a large segment of this society at one time or another. Many
people still consider these acts "immoral," perhaps even a majority in the
cases of nonmarital sex and abortion.
B. Barnes v. Glen Theatre
Barnes v. Glen Theatre,'32 decided in June, 1991, involved two
entertainment establishments in South Bend, Indiana, that desired to
present totally nude dancing performances. The Kitty Kat Lounge and the
Glen Theatre, as well as individual dancers employed by them, brought
suit in federal court to challenge the constitutionality of Indiana's public
decency law. 33 The law prohibits total nudity in public places. The
plaintiffs claimed the ban violated the First Amendment.
The Court issued four opinions in the case, with five Justices upholding
the constitutionality of the law and four Justices dissenting. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concluded that the nude
dancing in question was expressive activity and therefore implicated the
First Amendment, but that it could be prohibited because of the
"substantial government interest" in "protecting [societal] order and
morality."'134 Justice Souter agreed that First Amendment analysis was
130. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
131. Conkle, supra note 18, at 224.
132. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
133. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
134. Barnes, I I1 S. Ct. at 2462 (plurality opinion).
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appropriate and that the dancing could be banned. His analysis determined
that the state's "substantial interest" was in preventing such "secondary
effects""' as "prostitution, sexual assaults, and other criminal
activity."'3 6 Justice Scalia concurred in upholding the constitutionality
of the statute but did not believe that the First Amendment was
implicated. Applying a rule similar to that which he used for the majority
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 137
Scalia concluded that the Indiana law was "a general law regulating
conduct ... not specifically directed at expression," and therefore "not
subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all."'138
Four of the five majority Justices based their conclusions on their belief
that regulation of societal "morality" was an adequate justification for the
law.' 39 After observing that "[i]t is impossible to discern ... exactly
what governmental interests the Indiana legislators had in mind when they
enacted this statute,"'4 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist, nevertheless, concluded
that "the public indecency statute furthers a substantial government
interest in protecting order and morality.''. Similarly, Justice Scalia
observed that "[o]ur society prohibits . . . certain activities not because
they harm others but because they are considered ... immoral."1
42
Further, Scalia's opinion asserts "there is no basis for thinking that our
society has ever shared that Thoreauvian 'you-may-do-what-you-like-so-
long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else' beau ideal-much less for
thinking that it was written into the Constitution."
43
As in Bowers, the only real justification offered by the majority in
Barnes was that most people supported the law. To the extent that the
135. Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring and quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37).
137. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see infra notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
138. Barnes, III S. Ct. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy weighed the state's interest in
regulating "morality" against the citizen's free speech interests according to the analysis derived from
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), and found "morality" heavier. Justice Scalia simply
found that regulation of "morality" was a "rational basis" for the law.
140. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 2462 (plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Note the distinction Justice Scalia draws
between activities which "harm others" and those which society considers "immoral". As we have seen,
the Court has had no difficulty overturning other political proscriptions of "immoral" activities. See
supra text accompanying note 124. If, as Justice Scalia says, harm to others is not the standard by which
the Court should distinguish those political proscriptions of "immorality" that deserve constitutional
protection from those that do not, just what should that standard be? Justice Scalia's adoption here of
a political process majoritarian standard cannot be reconciled with Loving, Brown, or Roe.
143. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465 (plurality opinion).
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state was required to show an "interest," whether compelling, substantial,
important, or just rational, the assertion that most people believed the
conduct "immoral" was good enough.
C. The Rise of the Positive State
Bowers and Barnes involved direct state proscription of personal
conduct unrelated to protecting others from harm. The other two modem
Court decisions discussed in this Note involved indirect state proscription
through the mechanism of withholding monetary benefits. A full
understanding of the power of the state to influence behavior through its
allocation of burdens and benefits requires a brief review of the rise of
the Positive State since the New Deal.
The Supreme Court's ratification of the New Deal's economic program,
involving the Court's abdication of any responsibility for scrutinizing the
regulation of "ordinary commercial transactions," was the decisive event
enabling the enormous growth of government in the post-World War II
period. The Second World War, coming as it did in the immediate wake
of the Court's capitulation, provided yet another national crisis requiring
collective decision making.' Before the New Deal, economic regulation
had been the exception. After World War II, economic regulation had
become the norm. For example, after the war, Congress passed the
Employment Act of 1946,14 1 officially recognizing the federal
government's assumed responsibility for economic growth and full
employment.
The first distinction drawn by Justice Stone in his Carolene Products
opinion, between "legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions"
and legislation affecting the "specific prohibitions" of the
Constitution, 46 may have had some degree of validity in the pre-New
Deal world, where such economic regulation was relatively
144. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding detention without due process of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry in relocation centers on the West Coast during the early days
of World War II), offers further evidence of the ease with which a political majority, and the Supreme
Court, will sacrifice the interests of a minority in times of perceived "crisis." It is interesting to note
how many "crises" we are supposed to have today: the "health care crisis," the "education crisis," the
"housing crisis," and the "AIDS crisis" are examples. Whenever an interest group seeks to use
government power to achieve its political objectives, using the word "crisis" seems to help.
145. Pub. L. No. 79-304, 60 Stat. 23 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024 (1988)).
146. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
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exceptional. 47 In the modern world of the Positive State made possible
by the Court's capitulation, 48 however, the distinction is becoming
impossible to maintain. Confiscation and redistribution of economic
resources, that is, the allocation of burdens and benefits, have become the
central and dominating functions of governments at all levels-from local
school boards to the federal leviathan.
1. Economic Domination of the Positive State
Charles Reich identified this essential problem in 1964 in his article The
New Property.149 From his vantage point, approximately halfway
between the New Deal revolution and today, Reich observed that a
citizen's economic well-being was becoming increasingly a function of her
legal status as determined by her relationship to government.,50 In
addition, and as a result, a citizen's economic well-being could easily be
threatened by politically motivated governmental choices.,5 Inevitably,
the state's control of the economy implicated other noneconomic
considerations. Examples cited by Reich include withholding a license to
drive a taxi, and denying a license to work as a longshoreman or to run
a rooming house, all because of "immoral conduct" or "bad
character."'
152
As evidence of the extent of government pervasiveness in the nation's
economic affairs twenty-five years after the New Deal, Reich compares
total government spending at all levels 53 in 1961 to total personal
income' 54 for the nation in the same year, as compiled by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. 55 These two measurements approximate the
total amount of economic resources taken out of the economy by the
147. "Validity," as used here, refers to the ability to rationally distinguish economic regulation from
noneconomic regulation, not the constitutional validity of the double standard. See supra notes 93-109
and accompanying text.
148. Kreimer, supra note 27.
149. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.L 733 (1964).
150. Id. at 734.
151. Id. at 746-51.
152. Id. at 747.
153. This measurement includes local, state, and federal government spending.
154. Personal income is the current income received by a person from all sources minus their
personal contributions for social insurance. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 427 (1991).
155. Reich, supra note 149, at 737.
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government through taxation or borrowing'56 and the total amount
available to be taken. Total government spending in 1961 amounted to
approximately $165 billion,'5 7  and total personal income was
approximately $416.4 billion.5 8 In other words, in 1961, less than thirty
years after the judicial dam was broken, government at all levels had
assumed direct decision-making power over more than 39% of the
economic resources otherwise available to U.S. citizens that year.
The comparable figures for 1940, giving effect to the now seemingly
modest New Deal programs but before the massive military buildup for
World War II, were total government spending of approximately $20.4
billion 5 9  and personal income of $78.3 billion. 60 That was a
governmental share amounting to 26%. In the quarter century between the
New Deal and Reich's article, the government's share of the economy had
grown from 26% to 39%, a 50% increase.
It should come as no surprise more than a half century after the New
Deal, and more than a quarter century after Reich's article, that the
political majority's control over the nation's economic resources continues
to grow. The U.S. Department of Commerce figures for 1988, the most
recent year for which all the necessary data is available,' 6' reveal that
governments at all levels in the United States spent $1,920.4 billion 62
in that year. Total personal income in 1988 amounted to $4,070.8
billion. 163 That amounts to direct governmental decision-making power
over more than 47% of all the economic resources otherwise available to
private citizens in 1988.
As sobering as these figures are, they understate the actual degree of
government control over privately produced economic resources.
Regulations on the use of private resources 64 and mandated spending
156. Such economic resources are, of course, put back into the economy by the act of government
spending. Exploring the relative economic benefit of political versus private spending, however, is
beyond the scope of this Note.
157. Reich, supra note 149, at 737.
158. Id.
159. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES
TO 1970, Part 2, ser. Y 522-532, at 1119-20.
160. Id. Part 1, ser. F 6-9, at 224.
161. For some reason, the Department of Commerce chooses not to publish this calculation. It must
be compiled from several different sources.
162. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 154, table No. 466, at 280.
163. Id. table No. 702, at 434.
164. Examples of regulation on the use of private resources include zoning laws, various licensing
requirements, and public indecency laws.
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by businesses and individuals 6 effectively extend political control over
virtually all economic activity in the country.
66
2. Erosion of Private Property
One of the meanings of the Positive State's political domination of the
economy is that the concept of private property has been severely eroded.
As we have seen, the due process limitations on the deprivation of
property contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been
found to require no more than a majority vote in a state legislature. 67
Given that, the real "ownership" of all property, in the sense of being able
to control access to it and disposition of it, resides in the political
majority. Any amount of ownership that individuals are allowed to
maintain within their own control is only by "governmental choice," to
use Professor Tribe's term.
68
It has long been recognized that private property is an essential
prerequisite to human liberty as well as economic prosperity.
69
Although he was arguing for a different solution, Charles Reich perceived
the same problem in 1964, when the economic domination of the Positive
State had yet to begin in earnest.
Political rights presuppose that individuals and private groups have the
will and the means to act independently .... Civil liberties must have
a basis in property, or bills of rights will not preserve them....
Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the
existence of private property.7 0
Unfortunately, Reich's solution to the problem was simply to offer the
citizen another political promise that her "rights" to certain government
benefits would be vested as "property." The problem with such political
165. Examples of mandated spending by businesses and individuals include disability access, auto
safety features, required health and pension benefits, maternity leave, and minimum wage laws.
166. It is interesting and ironic, as we witness the collapse of socialist systems in Europe and Asia,
with corresponding calls for the benefits of "free market" economies, that we still think of the U.S.
economy as "free."
167. See supra notes 70-108 and accompanying text.
168. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 8-7, at 453.
169. Advocates of political process values say that property is a construct of the state. See, e.g.,
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 882. This conception confuses the function of the state in protecting and
resolving conflicting claims to property with the altogether separate act of creating property. Indeed,
the existence of property is a condition precedent for a state to come into being. Advocates of Bill of
Rights values say the "ownership" that a person has in the product of her intellect or labor is one of the
pre-political rights which the state is meant to defend. Legal systems that protect property do not create
property any more than laws against murder create human beings.
170. Reich, supra note 149, at 771.
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promises, that is, "allocations" of "rights" from the state, is that they
confirm, rather than deny, the state's power to allocate and to revoke.
Such "allocations" may be good only until the next committee meeting
when some competing interest offers a higher price.
The necessary linkage between property rights and the Bill of Rights has
been recognized by the Supreme Court in the post-New Deal Era.
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right
to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right
to speak or the right to travel, is, in truth, a 'personal' right, whether
the 'property' in question be a welfare check, a home or a savings
account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither
could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic
civil rights has long been recognized. 7'
As Justice Stewart's remarks show, the threat to Bill of Rights values
created by the rise of the Positive State has not gone unrecognized by the
Supreme Court. In fact, true to the second Carolene Products distinction
calling for increased judicial scrutiny protecting political process
participation of minorities,172 the Court's recognition of many civil
rights has been greatly expanded.' Unfortunately, the first distinction
in Carolene Products, abdicating any scrutiny of economic regulation, has
allowed the private property foundation of Bill of Rights values to be
undermined by the political process.
Because the framers understood the vital role of private property in a
free and prosperous society, they attempted to protect it with several
"specific prohibitions" in the Constitution.'74 As Madison foresaw,
however, those protections have not withstood "repeated violations in
extraordinary cases."'17
171. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (Stewart, J., for a majority
including Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall).
172. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
173. ELY, supra note 18, at 105-25. As examples of Supreme Court decisions expanding political
process participation, Professor Ely mentions, inter alia, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (all expanding the
Court's understanding of freedom of speech); and Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969), Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (all expanding voting rights).
174. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
175. 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 209.
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3. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
One way the Court has attempted to deal with the threat posed by
economic domination of the state has been the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. This doctrine is well established in American constitutional
law, having its roots in at least one pre-Civil War case.1 6 Generally, the
doctrine maintains that the government may not place conditions on the
receipt of benefits that would require a citizen to waive a constitutionally
protected right. In short, the state may not acquire by bargain that which
it may not take directly.' Given the nature of the doctrine, it is natural
that the courts would exercise it more frequently with the growth of the
Positive State as taker of resources and grantor of benefits. Since the
ability of the state to be a grantor of benefits is conditioned upon its
power over economic resources, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
has become a nexus of conflicting forces. Charles Reich's observation in
1964 that a citizen's economic well-being was increasingly determined by
her legal status, or relationship to the state, became much more relevant
in the succeeding twenty-eight years. In 1990, for example, more than
49% of federal government expenditures were transfer payments. 7 8 Very
substantial amounts in other budget categories also serve essentially the
same purpose.7 9 It would be virtually impossible to identify anyone who
is not affected to some extent, positively or negatively, by government
taking and giving of economic resources.
In light of this Positive State environment, the efficacy of the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions has been hampered by the blurring of the
distinction between restrictions placed on programs and conditions placed
on recipients, and by the reluctance of the Court to recognize
constitutionally mandated exemptions from "generally applicable laws."
176. Lafayette Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1856) (upholding conditions set by Ohio for foreign
corporations doing business within that state "provided they are not repugnant to the Constitution"). Id.
at 407, quoted in Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 n.7 (1988).
177. Note that the doctrine necessarily assumes that there are some limits to what the state may take.
178. Transfer payments are direct payments by the government which are not in connection with the
purchase of goods or services. The 49% figure in the text was derived by summing the percentage
distributions of selected 1990 estimated federal budget categories. The selected budget categories were
Income Security, Retirement and Disability (General and Federal Employee), Social Security and
Medicare, Veterans' Benefits and Services, and Farm Income Stabilization. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
supra note 154, table 509, at 316.
179. When military base closings were announced in 1991, for example, no one complained that the
nation would no longer be adequately defended. A great hue and cry arose, however, from those whose
employment would be affected. It is tempting to conclude that a large portion of the military budget
serves the same function as transfer payments.
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When a program or benefit is just one of several options, which may be
taken or left, the difference between program restrictions and recipient
restrictions is meaningful. When the Positive State absorbs 47% of the
nation's economic resources directly, and substantially more resources
indirectly, and when large segments of society depend on the state for
their economic existence, then restrictions on programs are restrictions on
recipients. The recent cases of Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith' 80 and Rust v. Sullivan'8 ' illustrate the
problem. These cases show the difficulty in the age of the Positive State
of maintaining Carolene Products' distinction between "ordinary
commercial" and other specifically protected rights. Without that
distinction, the threat posed by political process values is not limited to
economic rights in property, but extends to matters involving our physical,
sexual, and even our spiritual well-being.
D. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,182
decided in 1990, concerned two members of the Native American Church,
plaintiffs Smith and Black, who were fired from their jobs with a private
drug rehabilitation program because they ingested peyote, an
hallucinogenic drug, in the course of their religious ceremonies. The State
of Oregon subsequently denied Smith and Black unemployment
compensation because they were fired for "work-related
'misconduct."" 8 3 Smith and Black challenged the State's denial of
benefits as an unconstitutional violation of their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Court's majority opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy,
rejected the claims of the Native Americans. In doing so, the Court
effectively reversed established Free Exercise doctrine.184 Prior to Smith,
180. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
181. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
182. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
183. Id. at 874.
184. For other discussions of Smith, see GUNTHER, supra note 68, at 1573-86; Craig M. Cornish &
Donald B. Louria, Drug Testing in the Workplace: Employment Drug Testing, Preventive Searches, and
the Future of Privacy, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 95 (1991); Reich, supra note 14, at 1418-19; Steven




the Court required a government "to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.""'5 In his majority opinion,
however, Justice Scalia refused to apply that test, even to such a
"paradigm free exercise" case."' Rather, the Court announced a new
rule: "[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object of the
[law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended."1 17 In other words, unless the law in question singles out a
religious practice, it is valid and does not even trigger a First Amendment
question, regardless of what "incidental" effects it may have.
Justice Scalia's opinion makes no effort to conceal the dominance of
political process values in the reasoning of the majority. Significantly, he
quotes approvingly from a 1940 case written by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
Minersville School District v. Gobitis:18 8 "The mere possession of
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political
society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political
responsibilities .... 189 Bypassing more recent cases that did not suit
his purpose,'9 0 Justice Scalia reached back to the 1879 case of Reynolds
v. United States'9 to extract a statement of the principal concern of
those who worship at the altar of the political process: "[To] excuse [a
citizen's] practices . . because of his religious belief[s] . . . would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself."' 92 A reading of the First Amendment that was motivated by
Bill of Rights values would indeed conclude that "every citizen" should
be "a law unto himself" where religious belief and exercise are concerned.
To Justice Scalia and the majority in Smith, however, "to permit every
185. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Significantly, the question of whether the Native
American Church was a "religion" for First Amendment purposes was not argued in this case.
187. Id. at 878 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), rev'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Justice Felix Frankfurter was appointed to
the Court by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939.
189. Smith, 494 U.S. 879 (emphasis added) (quoting Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)).
190. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (granting exemption from unemployment
compensation regulations for Seventh Day Adventists); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(granting exemption from mandatory school attendance laws for the Amish).
191. 98 U.S. 145 (1878), rev'd, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
192. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67).
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citizen to become a law unto himself' represents the worst of evils rather
than a highly desirable object of civilized society.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that a citizen may not
be required to waive a constitutionally protected right as a condition for
the receipt of a government benefit. Notwithstanding that doctrine, that is
exactly what occurred in Smith. The Native Americans' exercise of their
religious beliefs was labeled "misconduct" by a "generally applicable"
law. As a result, the only way Smith and Black could have made
themselves eligible for unemployment compensation in Oregon was to
forego their religious practices.
It is not difficult to imagine a "generally applicable" law that would
prohibit the serving of food and/or alcoholic beverages to groups of ten
persons or more, outside of a private residence, or without a license or
permit from a government public health agency. Laws already exist that
prohibit the serving of alcohol to minors. According to the majority in
Smith, enforcement of such laws, combined with state refusal to grant a
license, could constitutionally shut down the Roman Catholic Church in
this country, or at least limit its current worship practices. The substantial
government interest in preventing disease, maintaining public health, and
protecting the morality of our young people would clearly outweigh the
limited and personal interests of a group of people who desired to engage
in aberrant behavior contrary to the general welfare and in direct
contravention of "generally applicable" laws. As Justice Scalia said in
Smith, "[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that
are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself ....
Most do not take the possibility of the Supreme Court shutting down the
Catholic Church due to its "misconduct" very seriously because the
Church has millions of adherents and substantial political influence. It is
very capable of using the political process to protect itself. The Native
Americans of Oregon are neither so numerous nor so influential.
Notwithstanding Justice Stone's words in footnote four of Carolene
Products, the political process cannot be relied on to protect the interests
of minorities. That is what the Supreme Court is supposed to do.
193. Id. at 890.
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E. Rust v. Sullivan
The case of Rust v. Sullivan'9 4 arose in 1988 when the United States
Department of Health and Human Services rewrote regulations governing
the use of funds appropriated for family planning services under Title X
of the Public Health Services Act.' 5 Congress passed the Act originally
in 1970. The language of the Act states that none of the funds
appropriated "shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of
family planning."'' 96 The newly rewritten regulations prohibit Title X
recipients from counseling, referring, or advocating abortion in any way.
They also require clinics receiving Title X funds to maintain strictly
separate physical facilities and financial records, to ensure that abortion-
related services are clearly distinct from Title X funded services. Several
Title X grantees and doctors brought suit to challenge the new regulations
under the First and Fifth Amendments as violating their freedom of speech
and right of privacy. 197
The Court, in a majority opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and joined by Justices White, Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter, denied the
petitioners' First Amendment claim that the new regulations impermissibly
prohibited "all discussion about abortion as a lawful option . .. while
compelling the clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes
continuing a pregnancy to term."'9' "The Government can," said the
Chief Justice, "without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternate program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way."' 99 In addition, the Court
said, "within. far broader limits than petitioners are willing to concede,
when the government appropriates public funds to establish a program it
is entitled to define the limits of that program."20 0 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that such limits and restrictions on the program do not invoke
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Restrictions on the program
are not the same as restrictions on the recipient.
194. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
195. Pub. L. No. 91-5727, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300 to 300a-41(1988)).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988).
197. Rust, I I I S. Ct. 1759. The suits also challenged the permissibility of the regulations under the
statute, but this Note focuses on the constitutional issues.
198. Id. at 1771-72 (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 11, Rust (No. 89-1391)).
199. Id. at 1772.
200. Id. at 1773.
1993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
[O]ur "unconstitutional conditions" cases involve situations in which
the government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy
rather that [sic] on a particular program or service, thus effectively
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside
the scope of the federally funded program.20'
...The recipient is in no way compelled to operate a Title X
project; to avoid the force of the regulations, it can simply decline the
subsidy." 2
The petitioners' claim that the regulations violated a woman's Fifth
Amendment right to choose an abortion was also rejected. "The
Government has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely
because the activity is constitutionally protected and may validly choose
to fund childbirth over abortion."2 3 Congress's refusal to fund abortions
leaves "an indigent woman at least the same range of choice in deciding
whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had
if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all."20 4
When the Court's reasoning is considered in light of the Positive State
domination of the economy, its basic premises are drawn into question.
According to the majority opinion, the program restrictions do not infringe
the petitioners' First Amendment rights of free speech, or their pregnant
clients' rights to choose an abortion, because they can always exercise
their rights outside the scope of the program.
Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a
pregnant woman with the same choices as if the government had
chosen not to fund family planning services at all. The difficulty that
a woman encounters when a Title X project does not provide abortion
counseling or referral leaves her in no different position than she would
have been if the government had not enacted Title X.2
Earlier in the opinion, the Court noted:
The regulations govern the scope of the Title X project's activities, and
leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities. The Title X grantee
can continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-related services,
and engage in abortion advocacy; it simply is required to conduct those
activities through programs that are separate and independent from the
project that receives Title X funds. 20 6
201. Id. at 1774 (emphasis in original).
202. Id. at 1775 n.5.
203. Id. at 1776.
204. Id. at 1777 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1774 (emphasis in original).
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The Court's reasoning rests on premises that ignore the economic impact
of the Positive State. The Court assumes that both pregnant women and
doctors who operate family planning clinics are unaffected by a political
process that absorbs almost half of the economic resources available to the
country. As Reich observed in 1964, however, the fact that the
government has become the source of "largess 20 7 to so many does make
a difference. A pregnant woman is not left with the same choices she
would have had in the absence of the Positive State when governments at
all levels take 47% of the economy's personal income and then make
"'value judgment[s]""'2 8 that exclude the services she desires. The very
magnitude of the governments' economic role crowds out free market
actors who ordinarily might respond to demands, like the pregnant
woman's, that are not large enough to command a political majority. This
is not to suggest, necessarily, that more abortion counseling services
would be available to indigent women within a totally free market
environment. °9 It does suggest, however, that women's choices would
be significantly different than they are presently. Among other things, the
possibility of more privately funded programs would be enhanced
enormously. Not only would there be many more resources in private
hands, but also those private hands would not need to obtain a majority
vote in a legislature before they could act.
The Rust decision places in stark relief the point not understood by the
modern Court or the Carolene Products majority; that is, the Positive
State necessarily constrains the freedom of action for all citizens who are
unable to utilize the power of the political majority on their behalf. These
constraints occur in two ways. First, the "independent means" necessary
for action are taken away by the state through taxation and regulation.
Second, the space available for independent action is constricted by the
Positive State's crowding out effect, that is, its domination of the field
through "generally applicable" laws and restrictions on programs crowds
out private actors who would otherwise offer services. If doctors and
nurses were not operating family planning clinics under Title X, for
example, they could be offering both family planning and abortion
counseling. The "largess" available under the program forces them to
207. Reich, supra note 149.
208. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
209. To conclude, however, that no more abortion counseling services would be available in a
completely free marketplace would require acceptance of the proposition that none of the funds freed




choose to do it the political majority's way or, effectively, not to do it at
all.
Maintaining the distinction between legislation affecting "ordinary
commercial transactions '2 " and legislation affecting "specific
prohibition[s] ' 21 1 of the Constitution becomes impossible when the state
absorbs and makes "value judgment[s]"2"2 about the allocation of almost
half the economic resources available to its citizens. Native Americans
must either forego a benefit ordinarily available to all or give up their
religious practices. Pregnant women seeking abortion counseling and
doctors wanting to give such counseling are restricted because the
government program they both rely on comes with strings attached.
Smith and Rust are also examples of the disappearance of the Carolene
Products footnote four distinction for the modern Court. If there are any
"specific prohibition[s]" in the Constitution, the Free Exercise Clause 2, 3
of the First Amendment is surely one of them. Yet, Justice Scalia's
opinion for the majority in Smith does for the Free Exercise Clause what
Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Blaisdell did for the Contracts Clause.
Just as the Court ignored the words of the Contracts Clause in Blaisdell,
so the majority in Smith ignored the words of the Free Exercise Clause.
Notwithstanding the Carolene Products distinction, the "specific
prohibition" in the First Amendment ultimately had no more deterrent
effect than the "specific prohibition" in Article I.
The message of the Smith and Rust majorities is that the government can
"allocate" the public's "resources" any way the political majority chooses
to, and it may enforce "generally applicable" laws regardless of their
"incidental" infringement on constitutionally protected conduct. When
these decisions are combined with the message of the New Deal revolution
that the political majority may take or regulate economic resources
without any meaningful constitutional constraint, little, if any, room is left
for individual nonconformity "opposed to the decided sense of the
public. '21 4 Much more than property and contract rights have been
infringed. As Charles Reich observed in 1964, "[p]olitical rights
presuppose ... the will and the means to act independently. ' 215 The will
may still be there, but the means are controlled by the political majority.
210. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
211. Id.
212. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1759, 1772.
213. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] . . ").
214. 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 2, at 299.
215. Reich, supra note 149, at 771.
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IV. THE CASES COMPARED
When the modem decisions discussed in Part III are compared to the
New Deal decisions discussed in Part II, the similarities become clear.
Most obviously, these are all cases in which the Court decides that the
division of power established by the Constitution favors the political
216majority over a protesting minority. All concern voluntary
transactions involving two or more adults, except in Smith, where the
"harm" was self-inflicted. In all of the cases, the Court allows the rule of
uninvolved parties, other people called the "government," to control.
When the Court is asked, "Who decides?," it answers, "The collective."
In each of the cases, the individual or minority group desired to engage
in conduct which it believed to be beyond the control of the state: Michael
Hardwick wanted to engage in homosexual sodomy without fear of arrest;
Mr. Smith and his co-religionists wanted to ingest peyote in the course of
their religious ceremonies; the Glen Theatre, the Kitty Kat Lounge, and
their employees wanted to offer entertainment by consenting adults for
consenting adults; the family planning clinics wanted to provide abortion
counseling; the grocer Nebbia wanted to offer his customers a lower price
for milk; the Home Building and Loan Association wanted to enforce its
valid contract; the West Coast Hotel wanted to deal directly with its
employees to negotiate the terms of their employment; and Carolene
Products wanted to offer a less expensive market alternative to natural
whole milk. In each case, the Supreme Court determined that their private
acts were not protected by the Constitution from interference by other
citizens who happened to outnumber them.
The second way in which the decisions are similar is that each one, with
the exception of Rust, departed from established Court doctrine to extend
the reach of the political majority into a region it had not previously, or
at least recently, occupied. Many commentators2. 7 believed that the right
of privacy doctrine, established in the line of cases beginning with
Griswold v. Connecticut,2 t running through Eisenstadt v. Baird,2 19 and
culminating in Roe v. Wade,2 2 0 extended to cover all sexual conduct,
216. Shortly after the Rust decision was handed down, a majority of both houses of Congress voted
to amend Title X of the Public Health Services Act to allow for abortion counseling. President Bush
vetoed the amendment and Congress failed to override it. When a badly drafted law is combined with
a determined Executive, the "political majority," it seems, becomes 34 senators.
217. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 18, at 216.
218. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
219. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
220. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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whether reproductive or not, between consenting adults."'
Notwithstanding the clear doctrinal implications, the Court found that the
Constitution did not protect Michael Hardwick from the "morality" of the
political majority of Georgia.
In Barnes, only four Justices of the five Justice majority applied the
established doctrinal analysis. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, believed that the "police power" of the state
extended to overseeing the "morality" of its citizens and that such interest
outweighed the First Amendment interests of the nightclubs and their
employees. Justice Souter chose to consider the state's interest in
preventing so-called "secondary effects" of the proposed entertainment,
even though no evidence of such effects was in the record. He found that
the hypothetical "secondary effects" outweighed the First Amendment
interests. That more-or-less conventional analysis, however, would not
have decided the case. Four dissenting Justices, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, conducted a similat ad hoc balancing exercise and
found that the First Amendment interests of the clubs and employees
outweighed the "police power" interest of the state. The case was
effectively decided by the Justice who departed from established
analytical doctrine. Justice Scalia chose to break new ground and apply
an across-the-board rule similar to that which garnered a majority of the
Court in Smith. A "general law" controlling conduct, said Justice Scalia,
must be obeyed, so long as the law does not seek specifically to stifle
expression. Justice Scalia's analysis never reached the First Amendment.
Similarly, Mr. Smith and his Native American co-religionists had good
reason to believe that the Court would grant them an exemption from
Oregon's anti-drug laws. Prior to Smith, established Free Exercise Clause
doctrine required the state to show a "compelling interest" to justify
applying a law in a way that would infringe the free exercise of a
citizen's religion. Justice Scalia's majority opinion, however, reversed that
doctrine and established a new rule granting no exemptions to generally
applicable criminal statutes.
It cannot be fairly said that the Rust decision departed from established
constitutional doctrine. As Chief Justice Rehnquist said in his opinion, the
decision was consistent with other recent opinions upholding states'
refusals to fund abortion-related services.222 By illustrating the way the
Positive State can influence constitutionally protected behavior through
221. Conkle, supra note 18, at 221-22.
222. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1759.
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restrictions on programs, however, the decision does leave the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions with a very narrow field on which to play.
The New Deal cases also, of course, broke new ground for the state.
Nebbia and Blaisdell signaled the end of the Lochner Era by upholding
the state's violation of property and contract rights previously held to be
protected by the Constitution.223 West Coast Hotel overturned a contrary
decision under similar facts,224 and Carolene Products established a new
standard of deference to a legislature's "findings," while creating a double
standard for constitutional rights225 that would guide the Court for a
generation.
The third way in which these decisions are similar is that the power of
the state is not invoked for the purpose of preventing harm to others. In
each case, the conduct involved, namely, engaging in sodomy, chewing
peyote, nude dancing, abortion counseling, selling milk at a low price,
enforcing a valid contract, negotiating freely with an employee, or
offering a cheaper alternative product, was outlawed either because the
conduct supposedly harmed the person who wanted to engage in it, or
because the conduct would withhold a benefit from a third party.226 In
no case was the decision justified as protecting a citizen from violence,
theft, deceit, or fraud of another. Even in Rust, the interests considered
by the Court did not include those of the fetus. In fact, no one would have
been harmed had any of the decisions gone otherwise.22 7
223. See supra part II.B.
224. See supra part II.C-D.
225. See supra part II.E.
226. Rust v. Sullivan is again somewhat different from the other modem cases. "Pro-life" advocates
attribute fill personhood to the unborn fetus so that regulations limiting abortion counseling can be said
to prevent harm to someone. Whether and when a fetus is a person, with all the legal rights such status
implies, is the central point of disagreement in the abortion controversy.
227. This statement is obviously measuring harm from a "baseline" of free market relationships
among the parties. Using such a reference point, no voluntary transaction, whether commercial or sexual,
can be considered harmful to any party. If a party believed the transaction harmful, she would not
volunteer to participate in it. The outcome of a voluntary transaction may, of course, be negative for one
or both of the parties, as in Blaisdell. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. That possibility
was anticipated, even bargained with, in the course of making the agreement. The realization of a
negative result, the possibility of which was agreed to in advance, cannot be considered harm in the
sense that term is used in the text. An offsetting benefit was bargained for in return for exposure to the
potential harm. The transaction would never have occurred without that benefit.
Justice Souter's "secondary effects" rationale in Barnes is an attempt to show harm to others as
justification. Even if some relationship to actual "secondary effects" could be demonstrated, how strong
a relationship would be required to justify such a proscriptive law? 1/10,000? 1/1,000? 1/100? Must
causation be proved, or only correlation?
In Bowers, "[tihe Court made no claim... that homosexual conduct causes physical harm either to
the individuals in question or to the society at large." Conkle, supra note 18, at 233.
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The rationales used by the Court to justify these decisions fall into two
general categories: (1) Paternalism, that is, the belief that the political
majority knows the best interests of an individual better than the
individual does;228 and (2) Unrestrained Majoritarianism, that is, the
belief that there are no limits to the horizontal reach of the political
majority, and that the majority may therefore use an individual against her
will in the "public interest."'229 When Paternalism, as exercised by the
political majority, is recognized as no more than imposing the views of
the majority on a recalcitrant minority, both categories of justification are
in their most fundamental senses asserting the same thing, namely, the
political majority's "right" to use the minority; to make the minority a
means to the achievement of the majority's end. In the New Deal cases,
the end that the political majority purported23 ° to have in mind was a
more "just" distribution of burdens and benefits. In the modern cases, the
end is more akin to social conformity, moral conformity, or both.
The common value shared by both the "liberal" decisions of the New
Deal and the recent "conservative" decisions of the modem Court is the
belief that a democratic political majority, in order to accomplish its
objectives, may legitimately coerce those who disagree with it. By this
analysis, Justice Scalia and the other "conservative" Justices on the
modern Court are just as much social reformers as the New Dealers were.
The "conservative" decisions of the modern Court rest, at bottom, on the
same political process values as the "liberal" decisions of the New Deal.
Whether their objective is a more "just" distribution of economic
resources, or a less "sinful" way of living, both "liberals" and
''conservatives" attempt to use the coercive power of the state to enforce
their conception of the good society.
"Pro-life" advocates would disagree regarding Rust. To the extent that an unborn fetus is attributed
legal status as a person, restrictions on abortion are justified as preventing harm to others.
228. Bowers, Barnes, Smith, and Rust all fall into this category. In each case, the personal behavior
orthodoxy of the political majority is imposed on a minority.
229. Nebbia, West Coast Hotel, Blaisdell, and Carolene Products all fall into this category. In each
case, the challenged law imposed an economic loss on some citizens and provided a direct monetary
benefit to others.
230. "Purported" is used here because the actual interests served by the laws upheld were private
"special interests." In this connection, it is interesting to consider the similarities and differences between
Nebbia and West Coast Hotel. In both cases, the political majority intervened to fix the minimum price
of a market commodity and the fixed price worked to harm the consuming public: higher costs for the
hotel operator to pass on to his customers, and higher milk prices for the consumers of New York. Note
the difference, however-the guilty party was the seller in Nebbia, and the buyer in West Coast Hotel.
These cases illustrate the fallacy of using terms like the "public interest" to explain such legislation.
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It is instructive to imagine how the rhetoric used by modern scholars to
explain, justify, and even applaud the New Deal cases and the de facto
constitutional amendment they represent might be utilized in support of
the modern Court's decisions. One might say, for example, that those who
criticize the Bowers or Barnes decisions base their views on an
anachronistic, free market, live-and-let-live, baseline assumption. Use of
just such a baseline was criticized by Justice Scalia when he said, "there
is no basis for thinking that our society has ever shared that Thoreauvian
'you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else'
beau ideal-much less for thinking that it was written into the
Constitution."2 3 ' Such beliefs rest on an "anachronistic understanding of
'limited government.' 23 2 There is, of course, nothing "natural" about
such a "Thoreauvian ... beau ideal." Government may make a "political
choice" of whatever baseline for personal behavior orthodoxy it chooses.
To allow Mr. Bowers and the Kitty Kat Lounge to be "laws unto
themselves"-to allow judicial enforcement of a free market "ordering"
of behavior contrary to the public conception of "justice" or
"morality"-would be "undemocratic" and "countermajoritarian. '"233
Judicial enforcement of such a baseline "represents a governmental choice
with discernable consequences" for the distribution of pleasure and
personal fulfillment.2 34 Surely, in our democratic society, we cannot
allow such rigid formalisms as an anachronistic, free market, live-and-let-
live, behavioral baseline to stand in the way of.our "reconstruct[ing] ...
a legally cogent ... higher law ... to govein... in the name of We the
People." '235
With arguments like these, behavioral orthodoxy may become as
"politically correct" as distributive orthodoxy.
When it is understood that the modern Court decisions and the New
Deal Court decisions both reflect an interpretation of the Constitution that
emphasizes political process values, one is forced to ask why the
conventional labels place them at opposite ends of the political spectrum.
Why do the New Deal decisions please "liberals," and the modern
decisions please "conservatives," when an analysis of the cases in terms
231. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (1991).
232. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 429.
233. Id. at 439.
234. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 6-17, at 453.
235. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 744.
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of conflicting constitutional values places them together on the
majoritarian end of the constitutional spectrum? 23 6
The answer may be that in the absence of a principled and consistent
defense of Bill of Rights values by the Supreme Court since the New Deal
revolution, the majoritarian premises of the Positive State have been
uncritically accepted by our society's other institutions. Bill of Rights
values have been submerged below the baseline of unexpressed
majoritarian assumptions. All "interests" are to be pursued through the
Positive State. Both liberals and conservatives attempt to reform society
by using the coercive mechanisms of the state to achieve their political
objectives. The distinction between them is in the nature of their
objectives, not in their underlying political values. Both groups seek to
broaden the horizontal reach of majoritarianism and are more than willing
to use the state to impose their biases on those who disagree.
If there is a solution to the problem described in this Note, it is surely
not to be found in the realm of politics. The solution must be found in
defining just what the realm of politics really ought to be, that is, in
defining the horizontal reach of democratic majoritarianism. Only the
Supreme Court can effect such a solution. The way for the Court to begin
is to impose a truly meaningful test to determine the constitutionality of
government restrictions on human behavior, a test that would require
justification by a significant showing of harm to others, with harm
measured from a pre-political baseline. Such an approach would be a truly
principled recognition of the proper role of Bill of Rights values in our
constitutional jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
It is fashionable these days for Americans to congratulate themselves for
winning the Cold War. Some even assert that the emergence of "liberal
democracy" as the only remaining legitimate form of government
represents "the end of history. 237  This Note has attempted to
236. A political dichotomy more accurately reflective of the value dichotomy in the Constitution is
"libertarian" versus "majoritarian." A libertarian view challenges the assumptions of the Positive State
and emphasizes Bill of Rights values. A majoritarian view, as we have seen, emphasizes political
process values and considers "society" as the moral unit instead of the individual human being. As
majoritarians of both liberal and conservative stripes realize that the political process threatens to draft
them into wars not of their choosing, perhaps more will opt to pursue their own objectives by means
of persuasion instead of political coercion.
237. FRANCIS FUKuYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (The Free Press 1992).
Fukuyama takes his title from the Hegelian dialectic view of history as driven by competing economic
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demonstrate, however, that there remains a dialectic tension within the
concept of "liberal democracy"-a tension between the autonomy of the
individual human being and the majoritarian democratic principle. To the
extent that majoritarianism is allowed to overwhelm the individual, we
risk losing all that we think we won in the Cold War. To paraphrase
Madison, wherever there is an interest and a power to impose orthodoxy,
orthodoxy will generally be imposed, not less readily by a powerful and
interested democratic political majority than by a powerful and interested
authoritarian bureaucracy.238
Those who came to political power in the 1930s realized that, if only
the Supreme Court would get out of the way, their version of economic
orthodoxy could be imposed.23 9 All they had to do was convince the
Court that Bill of Rights values were "countermajoritarian," and-that a
democratically elected government should be able to choose whatever
legal rules and economic "ordering" it wants. The subsequent judicial
capitulation began a process that has produced a Supreme Court that either
"balances" unequivocal constitutional prohibitions against "the public
interest '  or ignores them altogether. 24' The Court still insists that
the state may not require the waiver of constitutional rights in return for
government benefits, but Smith and Rust teach that, in the era of the
Positive State, enactment of "generally applicable" laws and restrictions
on programs instead of people accomplish essentially the same thing. Even
in the absence of government funding as an inducement to alter behavior,
Bowers and Barnes show that the logic of the political process argument
is irresistible to social reformers who would save us from ourselves.
As James Madison foresaw over two hundred years ago, political
process values have come to dominate Supreme Court jurisprudence. In
one application, the results please "liberals" because they advance the
goal of material equality. In another application, the results please
"conservatives" because they advance the goal of social conformity. The
lesson, perhaps, is that so long as political process values are controlling,
no one is secure from being drafted into someone else's war, be it a war
on drugs, a war on poverty, or a war on sin.
forces. In this view, the collapse of communist authoritarian states in 1989 and 1990 has left "liberal
democracy" as the only remaining form of government with any legitimacy. The end of the Cold War
competition between anti-democratic authoritarian states and "liberal democracies" is, in Hegelian terms,
"the end of history."
238. See quotation supra note 4.
239. Sunstein, supra note 6.
240. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, discussed supra part ILI.B.
241. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, discussed supra part III.D.
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The political process has become the icon of "liberal democracy" before
which all other interests bow down. Anyone who would reform society
according to her own conception appeals to the "public interest," the
"common good," or the "Will of the People," as if such an appeal grants
legitimacy to any means she may wish to use. Any solution may be
imposed in the name of "The People!" The political process may be
America's "Final Solution."
There is an argument based on utility which holds that collective,
politically motivated, economic resource allocation is inefficient, that it
creates too many externalities, and saps the dynamic spirit from any
economy, ultimately lowering the standard of living for everyone. Ample
evidence exists to support that argument.
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The more powerful argument favoring an interpretation of the
Constitution emphasizing Bill of Rights values, however, is a moral one.
It is an argument based on the recognition that the individual is the only
moral entity; that the essence of being human is having control over one's
own moral life; that paternalism, whether economic or behavioral, is
fundamentally dehumanizing because it robs the individual of control over
her own life; that authoritarianism, whether the result of democratic
processes or otherwise, necessarily treats some citizens as less than fully
human. This moral argument for individual autonomy has not been stated
better than by Isaiah Berlin:
[T]o manipulate men, to propel them towards goals which you-the
social reformer-see, but they may not, is to deny their human essence,
to treat them as objects without wills of their own, and therefore to
degrade them. That is why to lie to men, or to deceive them, that is, to
use them as means for my, not their own, independently conceived
ends, even if it is for their own benefit, is, in effect, to treat them as
sub-human, to behave as if their ends are less ultimate and sacred than
my own. In the name of what can I ever be justified in forcing men to
do what they have not willed or consented to? Only in the name of
some value higher than themselves. But if, as Kant held, all values are
made so by the free acts of men, and called values only so far as they
are this, there is no value higher than the individual.
243
242. The experiment in reduction to absurdity that has taken place in Russia and the other nations
that comprised the late Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may be the best argument yet devised to
rebut the assumptions of collectivism. As high as the price was for them, it may not have been high
enough for those of us on the outside looking in. With governments at all levels taking almost half of
the economic resources produced by American citizens, we should not be surprised that economic
growth and employment are lagging behind our expectations.
243. BERLIN, supra note 1, at 137.
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THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The Constitution, as imperfect and ambiguous as it is, has provided us
with a framework of government that has allowed the fullest realization
of human liberty yet experienced. It should not be interpreted as allowing
the political majority to treat the minority as "objects without wills of
their own," or "to behave as if [the minority's] ends are less ultimate and
sacred than [their] own.
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If we are to maintain and improve on our nation's achievements, and
avoid a slow retreat into cultural and economic mediocrity, our
institutions of government, like the Supreme Court, but especially The
People, must redefine their conception of the good society from one of
mandated conformity and material equality to one of protected individual
diversity and liberty.
244. Id.
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